

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04054 01 OF 04 251835Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07
L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02
USIA-06 TRSE-00 /064 W
-----251918Z 042361 /46

P 251809Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3808
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NATO 04054

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MNUC, NPG, NATO
SUBJECT: NPG: MAY 23 NPG PERMREP MEETING

REF: (A) USNATO 3394 (DTG 161310Z MAY 77)
(B) STATE 117719 (DTG 211251Z MAY 77)
(C) STATE 096359 (DTG 282128Z APR 77)

SUMMARY: AT THEIR MAY 23 MEETING, NPG PERMREPS APPROVED
WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORTS
ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (TNF) IMPROVEMENTS AND ON THE NPG
TECHNOLOGY STUDY. IN DISCUSSION OF TNF, THE FRG COMMENTED
ON THE NEED FOR NIKE HERCULES UNTIL A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT
WAS AVAILABLE, AND ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY VALUE OF
DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. THE UK CITED THE IMPORTANCE OF
POLITICAL FACTORS IN TNF MODERNIZATION AND, WITH THE
NETHERLANDS, HOPED THAT THE US WOULD INFORM THE ALLIES
BEFORE THE OTTAWA MEETING OF ANY IMPORTANT VIEWS THAT
DIFFERED FROM THE FINDINGS IN THE NATO MILITARY AUTHOR-
ITIES (NMA) STUDIES. ON THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, THE FRG
HIGHLIGHTED THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS IN THE POLITICAL IMPLI-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04054 01 OF 04 251835Z

CATIONS TEAM REPORT. OTHER ALLIES COMMENTED ON THE VALUE
OF THE OVERALL STUDY, AND OFFERED SOME GENERAL AND PRELIM-
INARY COMMENTS ON THE CONDUCT OF FURTHER WORK. THE FRG
AND SEVERAL OTHER REPS ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF
"CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK" CONTAINED IN THE RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON WORK FROM THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY
GROUP, WHICH ARE QUOTED IN PARA (8B) OF THE PERMREP

REPORT. ITALY OFFERED TO HOST THE AUTUMN 1977 NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING AND PROPOSED THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 9-15. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA 21 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

1. SYG LUNS, IN INTRODUCING THE TNF TOPIC, SUGGESTED THAT PARA 11 OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT (REF A) MIGHT BE MODIFIED SLIGHTLY TO REFLECT DPC MINISTERIAL ACTION ON LONG-TERM INITIATIVES RELATING TO AIR DEFENSE. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 11 WAS CHANGED TO READ "THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH GOES BEYOND THE NUCLEAR FIELD AND IS ALREADY BEING CONSIDERED BY THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE."

2. THE AMBASSADOR DREW ON REF B TO ADDRESS THE NIKE HERCULES AND DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) STUDIES AND AGREED TO CIRCULATE HIS STATEMENT.

3. PAULS (FRG) SAID THE SHAPE STUDIES WERE OF GREAT VALUE, EVEN THOUGH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE, AND THE LIMITATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK, DID NOT PERMIT FINAL ANSWERS TO ALL QUESTIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NIKE HERCULES WAS AN OLD AND INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE SYSTEM. NONETHELESS, IT WAS THE ONLY SURFACE-TO-AIR CAPABILITY NOW AVAILABLE IN NATO'S OVERALL AIR DEFENSE POSTURE WHICH COULD COPE WITH THE MEDIUM- TO HIGH-LEVEL THREAT. HE SAID IT WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE SHAPE STUDY TO DETERMINE IF CHANGES IN THE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL NIKE HERCULES SITES WERE DESIRABLE. WHETHER ADDITIONAL STUDY, BEYOND THE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY SHAPE, WOULD LEAD TO OTHER CONCLUSIONS THAN THOSE CONTAINED IN THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04054 01 OF 04 251835Z

PRESENT STUDY REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION. PAULS WELCOMED RECOGNITION THAT AN IMPROVED OVERALL AIR DEFENSE POSTURE WAS A MATTER OF PRIORITY, AND THAT NATO MUST LOOK TOWARD REPLACEMENT OF NIKE HERCULES IN THE 1980S BY A MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM, PERHAPS WITH ONLY A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY.

4. PAULS AGREED WITH THE FINDINGS IN THE DCA STUDY. HE SAID THE FLEXIBILITY OF DCA MADE THESE SYSTEMS OF HIGH VALUE FOR NATO, PARTICULARLY FOR SELECTIVE RELEASE, AND THAT OTHER SYSTEMS COULD SUPPLEMENT, BUT NOT REPLACE THEM. A FULL DETERMINATION OF DCA REQUIREMENTS COULD ONLY BE MADE IN FURTHER STUDY, AIDED BY MORE DATA FROM THE US. FINALLY, PAULS PROPOSED AN ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 11 OF THE PERMREPS REPORT, AS FOLLOWS,"(E) CONFIRM THAT DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, DUE TO THEIR FLEXIBILITY, HAVE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE." PERMREPS ACCEPTED THE ADDITION.

5. KILLICK (UK) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE NMA STUD-

IES. HE WISHED THAT TIME ALLOWED FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL PERMREP DISCUSSION, BUT ACCEPTED THE PERMREPS REPORT, WHILE REGRETTING ITS NEUTRAL TONE. HE COULD NOT ANTICIPATE WHAT MOD MULLEY MIGHT SAY AT OTTAWA. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR MEMBERS TO PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF ANY IMPORTANT NEW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE STUDIES TO ALLOW FOR MORE FRUITFUL DISCUSSION AT OTTAWA. KILLICK SAID THE EUROPEANS WERE PARTICULARLY ATTENTIVE TO POLITICAL FACTORS IN TNF ISSUES, AND THAT WHAT AND HOW TO MODERNIZE WAS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME BASED ON

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04054 02 OF 04 251842Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07

L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02

USIA-06 TRSE-00 /064 W

-----251919Z 042436 /46

P 251809Z MAY 77

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3809

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA

USNMR SHAPE BE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 NATO 04054

PURELY MILITARY ANALYSIS.

6. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) AGREED WITH KILLICK. HE NOTED THAT THE PERMREPS REPORT, AT US INSISTENCE, WAS NEUTRAL AND REVEALED NO CONCLUSIONS. HE SAID IF THE US DID NOT SUPPORT THE STUDIES' FINDINGS, HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THE REASONS BEFORE THE OTTAWA MEETING.

7. SVART (DENMARK) SAID THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT WAS CIRCULATED TOO LATE FOR HIS AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SPECIFIC REMARKS. HE SUPPORTED KILLICK'S COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF TNF ISSUES. HE ASKED, SINCE DENMARK WOULD NOT BE PRESENT AT THE OTTAWA MEETING, ABOUT THE FATE OF THE TWO NMA STUDIES: WOULD THEY REMAIN SUB-

JECTS OF FURTHER DISCUSSION, WITH NO DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS AT OTTAWA? SYG LUNS SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO AWAIT MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS.

8. ZEINER GUNDERSEN (CMC) SAID KILLICK'S INTERVENTION PROMPTED HIM TO REMARK THAT THE MILREPS OF NPG NATIONS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04054 02 OF 04 251842Z

AGREED WITH SACEUR THAT, IF A POLITICAL DECISION WERE TAKEN TO REDUCE NIKE HERCULES, MINIMAL CONTIGUOUS NUCLEAR INTERCEPT AREA COVERAGE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

9. THE AMBASSADOR, RESPONDING TO CONSENSUS RESPONSE, SAID THE US HAD WISHED TO AVOID A DRAFT THAT PREJUDGED DISCUSSIONS ADDRESSED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. HE UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD ALLIED COMMENTS TO HIS AUTHORITIES, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE USEFUL IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE OTTAWA MEETING. (COMMENT: WE SEE NO NEED TO NOTIFY ALLIES PRIOR TO THE OTTAWA MEETING OF THE NATURE OF SECRETARY BROWN'S COMMENTS ON THE TNF STUDIES. END COMMENT.)

10. IN DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, PAULS COVERED THE MAIN POINTS IN THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TEAM (PIT) REPORT AND SAID FRG WAS CIRCULATING AN EXPANDED STATEMENT, WHICH IS BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL. HE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED THE PIT REPORT:

-- CONFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY CONTAINED IN MC 14-3.

-- SHOWED THAT THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN LIGHT OF CONTINUED WARSAW PACT DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- SHOWED THAT NATO HAS NO OTHER OPTION THAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN LIGHT OF THE WARSAW PACT THREAT.

-- HIGHLIGHTED THE CONTINUING NEED TO CONSIDER THE QUANTITY AS WELL AS QUALITY OF NEW TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS.

11. IN REGARD TO FOLLOW-ON WORK IN NEW TECHNOLOGY, PAULS SAID THE FRG BELIEVED ANY FUTURE STUDIES NEEDED A SENSE OF PROPORTION, AND PRIOR ANALYSIS SHOULD INSURE THAT: THERE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04054 02 OF 04 251842Z

IS NO DUPLICATION OF EFFORT; THE STUDY IS FEASIBLE; THERE

IS A VALID NEED FOR THE WORK; AND THE STUDY RESULTS CAN BE PUT TO GOOD USE. THE PRESENT NATO PLANNING PROCESS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

12. PAULS SAID THE PHRASE (QUOTE) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (END QUOTE), AS USED IN THE FULL STUDY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS, REFERRED, IN THE FRG VIEW, TO ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER WORK. PAULS THEN ASKED IF ALLIES HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHRASE.

13. KILLICK ACCEPTED THE DRAFT PERMREP REPORT AND BELIEVED THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION. HE EXPECTED MINISTER MULLEY WOULD HAVE A GOOD DEAL TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT AND NOTED MULLEY'S STATEMENT ON NEW TECHNOLOGY AT THE DPC AND PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT AT THE LONDON SUMMIT. IN PARTICULAR, HE DREW ATTENTION TO PARA 50 OF THE PIT REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF NEW TECHNOLOGY TO ARMS CONTROL. KILLICK SAID THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSION OF PARA 54.F. OF THE PIT REPORT, AND HOPED THAT THE THRESHOLD QUESTION COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A CONCLUSION WHICH DID NOT QUALIFY THE ABILITY OF NEW TECHNOLOGY TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. HE STATED THAT THE UK AGREED WITH THE FRG INTERPRETATION OF (QUOTE) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (END QUOTE), WITH THE ADDITION OF ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS TO THOSE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

14. KILLICK SAID HE HOPED THAT PARA 9.E. OF THE DRAFT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04054 03 OF 04 251851Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07
L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02
USIA-06 TRSE-00 /064 W
-----251920Z 042514 /46

P 251809Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3810
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 NATO 04054

PERMREP REPORT WOULD NOT PRECLUDE FRANCE FROM JOINING IN ANY NEW TECHNOLOGY FOLLOW-ON WORK. SYG LUNS AGREED THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED, BUT THEY HAD NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION TO DATE. PAULS SAID THE FRG PREFERRED THE NPG OR DPC AS THE LOCUS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY FOLLOW-ON EFFORTS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FRENCH INDICATED A DESIRE TO JOIN IN THE WORK. KILICK AGREED WITH PAULS.

15. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID HE THOUGHT THE STUDIES PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT COSTS, STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY SHOULD BE COVERED IN FUTURE WORK. ALSO, INTERESTS OF ALL ALLIES MUST BE CONSIDERED. HE PROPOSED, AND PERMREPS ACCEPTED, THE FOLLOWING ADDITION TO PARA 9.B. OF THE DRAFT PERMREP REPORT ON NEW TECHNOLOGY: (QUOTE) THIS WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH ASPECTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AS COST-EFFECTIVENESS, STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE INTEREST OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. (END QUOTE)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04054 03 OF 04 251851Z

16. HARTOGH SAID THE HAGUE BELIEVED THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY TO BE OF HIGH QUALITY AND A GOOD CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. THEY SAW NO PROBLEM IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ASPECTS DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT. HIS AUTHORITIES AGREED THAT NEW TECHNOLOGY DID NOT CHANGE NATO'S BASIC STRATEGY, ONLY ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ALSO BELIEVED THAT REDUCED COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM POSSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE INCREASED NATO'S DETERRENT CAPABILITY. IN THE DUTCH VIEW, IMPROVED GUIDANCE AND MORE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS SERVED TO PUSH BACK THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HARTOGH SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE PIT STATEMENT REGARDING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN PARA 54.F. CONCERNING FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES, HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED MORE WORK WAS REQUIRED ON TACTICS AND NET ASSESSMENT. THEY HAD NO FIRM OPINION ON FUTURE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BUT THEY SAW ADVANTAGE IN THE NPG AS A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION, PROVIDING THAT STUDY RESULTS ARE DISSEMINATED TO OTHER BODIES. IN THIS RESPECT, THE NPG SHOULD PRIMARILY CONCERN ITSELF WITH NEW INITIATIVES. FOR THE MORE SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON TASKS, SUCH AS THE STUDY OF TACTICS AND NET ASSESSMENT, HE THOUGHT THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF, RESPECTIVELY, MIGHT UNDERTAKE SUCH WORK.

17. AMBASSADOR BENNETT RESPONDED BY DRAWING FROM GUIDANCE (REFS B AND C). IN RESPONSE TO PAULS' QUESTION REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE (QUOTE) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (END QUOTE) IN THE FULL STUDY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS, AMBASSADOR BENNETT SAID HE THOUGHT THE PHRASE, WHILE NOT EXCLUDING ORGANIZATION ARRANGEMENTS, WAS BROADER IN INTENT. HE SAID HE WOULD SEEK HIS AUTHORITIES VIEWS.

18. SYG LUNS SAID THAT ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04054 03 OF 04 251851Z

LONG TERM INITIATIVES BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE DPC. HE SAID HE FEARED OVERSTUDY AND OVERLOAD OF THE SYSTEM AND PREFERRED TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION AT OTTAWA TO DECIDE ON FUTURE NEW TECHNOLOGY WORK.

19. ZEINER GUNDERSEN SAID THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SUPPORTED STOCK-TAKING OF PRESENT NATO NEW TECHNOLOGY EFFORTS AS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP. HE ALSO SAID THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS TEAM (MIT) RECOMMENDATIONS WERE PRIMARILY MILITARY CONCERNS WHICH COULD BE BEST HANDLED IN MILITARY CHANNELS. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WAS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND NOT ON THE STRATEGY ITSELF. IN ITS VIEW, THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY TENDED TO CONCENTRATE TOO MUCH ON THE CENTRAL REGION. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT ANALYSIS OF TACTICS AND FORCE STRUCTURE WAS HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON HARDWARE ACQUISITION DECISIONS AND THEREFORE NEEDS TO BE WOVEN INTO LONG-TERM PLANNING.

20. UNDER ANY OTHER BUSINESS, CATALANO ANNOUNCED ITALY'S OFFER TO HOST THE AUTUMN 1977 NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING IN SOUTHEASTERN ITALY. HIS AUTHORITIES PROPOSED THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 9 TO 15, ALTHOUGH SOMETIME LATER IN THE MONTH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AS WELL. HE REQUESTED ALLIED REACTION TO THE PROPOSED DATES. COMMENT: THE DATES PROPOSED BY ITALY ARE RELATIVELY EARLY. PREPARATION TIME FOR THE MEETING WOULD BE COMPRESSED. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED DATES WOULD AVOID BACK-TO-BACK TRIPS TO EUROPE BY SECRETARY BROWN FOR

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04054 04 OF 04 251851Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07
L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02
USIA-06 TRSE-00 /064 W
-----251921Z 042537 /46

P 251809Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3811
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 NATO 04054

THE NPG AND DPC MINISTERIALS. END COMMENT.

21. ACTION REQUESTED: (A) WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF (QUOTE) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (END
QUOTE) (PARAS 12 AND 17 ABOVE), WHICH WE CAN PASS TO
ALLIES PRIOR TO THE MINISTERIAL MEETING AT OTTAWA;
(B) WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE
PROPOSED DATE FOR THE AUTUMN 1977 NPG MINISTERIAL
MEETING. IF THE PROPOSED DATE IS UNACCEPTABLE, WE
SHOULD PASS THIS INFORMATION TO ALLIES, AS WELL AS ANY
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS, PRIOR TO THE OTTAWA
MINISTERIAL MEETING. BENNETT

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977NATO04054
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770517/aaaaaocq.tel
Line Count: 420
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: 1ea9bc89-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 USNATO 3394 (DTG 161310Z MAY 77), 77 STATE 117719 (DTG 211251Z MAY 77, 77 STATE 096359 (DTG 282128Z APR 77, SUMMARY AT THEIR MAY 23 MEETING, N PG PERMREPS APPROVED, WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES THE DRA
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2363728
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPG: MAY 23 NPG PERMREP MEETING
TAGS: MNUC, NPG, NATO
To: SECSTATE WASHDC WASHDC MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1ea9bc89-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009